Which norms structure the proceedings — and what development of the law can mean in this case.

Development of the law — what is meant here

Development of the law does not mean inventing new law. Development of the law means applying existing norms to new structures — there, where the legislator has formulated the elements in general terms and the case-law must concretise these benchmarks for the constellation that actually arises.

That is precisely what the plaintiff submits: § 826 BGB has existed since 1900, the BGH benchmarks for the overall view under § 286 ZPO exist as a settled line, the law on intermediaries in § 34d GewO and §§ 59–63 VVG exists in its present form for years. What is, on the plaintiff's account, new is the architecture: a vertically integrated distribution and insurance system that combines formal status statements with counter-running trust communication. The question of how this architecture is to be assessed in the light of the existing norms has, from the plaintiff's perspective, fundamental significance reaching beyond the individual case.

Six pillars, each of which the plaintiff submits is independently capable of supporting § 826 BGB liability — embedded in an architecture that, on the plaintiff's account, brings these complexes about as a matter of plan.

The six pillars in overview

From the plaintiff's perspective each pillar already carries the § 826 BGB allegation on its own; in the overall view, on the plaintiff's account, the picture only becomes complete:

1. Contract genesis — covert worsening of the contractual mechanism with the cover formulation „Änderungen, die Sie gewünscht haben" [translation: "changes that you requested"].
2. Mis-policing — continued policing as „Pkw" [translation: "passenger car"] despite the rental operation being communicated early and repeatedly.
3. Mis-accounting — an accounting and adjustment mechanism which, on the plaintiff's account, only operates in one direction.
4. Pressure and authority mechanism — deregistration notifications and official enforcement mechanisms despite declared rights of retention.
5. Postal service / file integrity — a submitted anomaly in the tracking records of four postal-service-delivery orders prompted by the court.
6. Status deception / EVIL — on the plaintiff's account the overarching bracket: Earnings-oriented Trust-induced Loyalty deception as the precondition that pillars 1 to 5 work.

The defendants oppose this submission as a whole. They emphasise, among other things, that the tied agent model is recognised by law, that status disclosure has been made in the imprint and that immorality, intent and damage do not necessarily follow from their own evidence. The assessment of this architecture by the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court is pending.

§ 826 BGB · Intentional immoral damage

§ 826 BGB is a particularly strict basis of claim. Anyone who intentionally causes damage to another in a manner contrary to good morals is obliged to compensate.

Three conditions must be met together: immorality (a qualified evaluation of the conduct that goes beyond mere breach of contract), intent (deliberate bringing about of the damage) and damage (causally attributable to the conduct and concretely quantified). It is not enough for a contract to have been unfavourable or for a clause to be in dispute.

§ 286 ZPO · Free assessment of evidence and overall view

§ 286 ZPO governs how the court assesses the submitted facts. It is not bound by rigid evidence rules but may — and must — assess the entire content of the hearing and of the taking of evidence according to free conviction.

The case file invokes BGH III ZR 79/23 as the anchor for the overall assessment. In substance: indications must not be ticked off only in isolation — they must be assessed in their context, also where they speak for or against the allegation. This applies symmetrically to incriminating and exculpating indications.

§ 138 ZPO · Duty of truth and substantiated explanation

§ 138 ZPO obliges the parties to make complete and truthful statements about factual circumstances. A contestation must be substantiated — a blanket contestation does not suffice when the other side has submitted in concrete terms. From the plaintiff's perspective this is relevant, because the defendants must take a substantiated position on their own evidence from their own sphere (BLD exhibits), not merely contest formally.

§ 34d GewO · Insurance intermediaries and intermediary status

§ 34d GewO regulates the licensing requirement for insurance intermediaries and distinguishes between an insurance broker (classically a fiduciary of the customer) and a tied insurance agent (sales aid for specific insurers). § 34d para. 7 no. 1 GewO covers tied agents who act exclusively for one or several named insurance undertakings. Both models are legal.

The legal question in these proceedings is, on the plaintiff's account, not whether tied distribution is permitted, but whether the formal status statement loses its protective effect when the main communication stages a customer-side fiduciary role.

§§ 59–63 VVG · Duties of the insurance intermediary

§§ 59 to 63 VVG concretise the civil-law duties of intermediaries: § 59 VVG distinguishes between insurance broker and insurance agent; § 60 VVG obliges the broker to a sufficient survey of the market; §§ 61–63 VVG regulate the duties of advice, documentation and damages.

From the plaintiff's perspective §§ 59–63 VVG together with § 34d GewO constitute a benchmark for which programme of duties attaches to the respective intermediary role — and which duties are breached when the role image projected outwardly systematically diverges from the role lived internally.

§ 278 BGB · Vicarious agents and attribution

§ 278 BGB regulates the attribution of fault of persons of whom a debtor avails himself in the performance of his obligation. The plaintiff submits in her 2nd statement of claim extension of 27 April 2026 that the conduct of Defendant 1 (DVAG) is to be attributed to Defendant 2 (Generali) under § 278 BGB — based on the "exclusive distribution" agreement K42/K43 of 28 September 2017 and on the economic and personal interlinkages.

Three touchstones for observers

Observers are not a court. They do not decide whether § 826 BGB is satisfied. But they can observe whether the methodological requirements are observed:

1. Context instead of ticking off — are the six pillars considered together, or each one set aside in isolation?
2. Methodological treatment of the expert opinions — are expert statements weighed substantively, or formally dismissed as private expert opinions?
3. Substantive camp question — is the question answered whether the formal status statement can be neutralised by the main communication?

These touchstones protect both sides: a methodologically sound judgment can also be claim-dismissing, provided it assesses the pillars together and seriously examines the defendants' arguments. An allowing judgment only persuades if it does the same for the plaintiff side.