Regulatory oversight, regulation and distribution responsibility.
Which supervisory and regulatory questions can arise where financial and insurance distribution structures are closely interlinked — as of 9 May 2026.
Introduction
The following remarks do not constitute a finding of legal violations.
They describe regulatory and supervisory questions which, from the Plaintiff's perspective, can arise in connection with closely interlinked financial and insurance distribution structures.
The occasion is the proceedings TeslaNow GmbH v. Deutsche Vermögensberatung AG and Generali Deutschland Versicherung AG before the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main, case reference 2-10 O 2/26.
The Defendants contest the allegations.
No final and binding court decision or administrative determination has been issued.
This page therefore does not ask: "Which violations have been established?"
Rather: "Which regulatory examination fields can be touched upon when insurer, distribution channel, product interests, commission systems, marketing communication and customer perception are tightly interwoven?"
1. Why these questions can be relevant under supervisory law
Financial and insurance distribution is not just a civil-law contractual matter between customer, intermediary and product provider. It also touches on regulatory topics:
- transparency of the intermediary's role;
- product tying;
- conflicts of interest;
- commissions and sales incentives;
- product approval and target-market assessment;
- customer benefit and effective costs;
- complaints handling;
- distribution organisation;
- allocation of responsibility between insurer and distribution channel;
- European consumer- and investor-protection standards.
These topics are particularly relevant where an insurer and a distribution channel are economically, organisationally or personally closely connected.
In the specific proceedings, the case file describes, among other things, an exclusive distribution relationship between DVAG and Generali, personal interlinkages, commission structures, external presentation as coach/advisor/sparring partner, and the legal status as a tied agent under § 34d paragraph 7 of the Gewerbeordnung [German Trade Regulation Act].
2. BaFin, insurer supervision and distribution responsibility
One particular examination point concerns the role of Generali as a supervised insurance undertaking.
The Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) [German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] does not exercise general direct supervision over every individual insurance intermediary. Direct intermediary supervision usually lies with the competent Chambers of Industry and Commerce or trade authorities.
BaFin does, however, supervise insurance undertakings and their distribution-related activities. In particular, organisation, product approval, distribution remuneration, conflicts of interest, risk management, complaints handling and the customer interests of an insurance undertaking can therefore be relevant.
In its Guidance Notice 01/2023 (VA) on conduct-of-business aspects in capital-forming life insurance products dated 8 May 2023, BaFin describes — among other things — product approval procedures, target-market determination, product oversight, customer benefit, costs, distribution remuneration and conflicts of interest as topics relevant under supervisory law. The guidance notice draws on, inter alia, IDD requirements [Insurance Distribution Directive] and national rules such as § 23 and § 48a of the VAG [Insurance Supervision Act].
From the Plaintiff's perspective, a central question therefore arises:
May an insurer effectively offload regulatory responsibility by having essential customer outreach, trust-building and distribution carried out via a closely connected or exclusive distribution partner?
From the Plaintiff's perspective, this is at any rate worth examining where the insurer:
- profits economically from the distribution architecture;
- has integrated the distribution channel exclusively or structurally;
- is connected to the distribution channel through personal or organisational interlinkages;
- has products placed via this distribution channel;
- profits from the customer effect of the external presentation;
- but in the event of a dispute points to the distribution channel's independence.
This account contains no finding of a supervisory-law violation. It describes possible examination fields.
3. Supervisory-law relevant shifting of responsibility
A core problem can arise where responsibility is split between insurer and distribution channel.
The distribution channel produces the customer effect. The insurer provides products, policies, premiums, risk classifications and billing. The distribution channel communicates trust, advice, coaching or personal closeness. The insurer profits economically from the sales.
In a dispute, the danger can then arise that both sides point to each other:
- The distribution channel says: the product decision lay with the insurer.
- The insurer says: customer communication lay with the distribution channel.
- The customer is caught between the two structures.
- Regulatory responsibility becomes practically hard to grasp.
From the Plaintiff's perspective, a close distribution interlinkage must not lead to supervisory requirements running empty.
It is therefore worth examining whether an insurer adequately monitors, controls and organisationally masters the distribution risks of an exclusive or closely connected distribution system.
4. Responsibility at group level
A further regulatory examination point concerns the question whether, in addition to the German insurance subsidiary, the group level of an international insurance group can also become relevant under supervisory law.
A group parent does not automatically incur liability for every act of a subsidiary. European insurance supervisory law does, however, expressly provide for group supervision under Solvency II (Directive 2009/138/EC, Art. 213 et seq.). It is intended to ensure that risks, governance structures, intra-group interlinkages and the organisation of an insurance group are not considered only in isolation at the level of the individual entity. BaFin lists, as tasks of group supervision, among others, the assessment of the governance system, of risk concentrations, of intra-group transactions and of solvency at group level.
From the Plaintiff's perspective, it is therefore worth examining:
- whether the exclusive distribution architecture between Defendant 2 (Generali) and Defendant 1 (DVAG) is to be assessed as an isolated local measure or as part of a group-wide embedded distribution strategy;
- whether knowledge or constructive knowledge of the consumer, product-fit and conflict-of-interest risks associated with this distribution architecture existed at group level;
- whether the economic benefits from the distribution system accrue at group level, while the customer-shaping distribution effect is formally attributed to the German subsidiary and its exclusive distribution partner;
- whether the group-wide governance and compliance structures provided for under Solvency II are suitable for detecting and avoiding systematic violations.
This question contains no finding of liability of the group parent. It describes a possible supervisory-law and group-law examination field.
5. Transparency of the intermediary's role
One regulatory examination point concerns the question whether customers can sufficiently clearly recognise the type of market participant they are dealing with.
A distinction must be drawn in particular between:
- independent insurance broker (§ 34d paragraph 1 GewO);
- insurance advisor (§ 34d paragraph 2 GewO);
- tied insurance intermediary (§ 34d paragraph 7 GewO);
- multiple agent;
- financial distribution channel with a product-partner structure;
- distribution partner of a particular insurer or group.
The separation requirement of § 34d GewO is well established in higher-court case law. The Oberlandesgericht Köln, in its judgment 6 U 63/25 of 11 March 2026, held that advertising statements about a distribution channel's "independence" can be inadmissible even where they create a mistaken impression in a not insignificant part of the public addressed. Already the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, in its judgment 6 U 238/09 of 2 December 2010, had ruled that advertising with "independent" can be prohibited even at a lower misperception rate.
Cases worth examining can be those in which the external presentation uses terms such as "coach", "advisor", "sparring partner", "life companion", "all-finance advice" or "independent financial advice", while the legal position is in fact that of a tied or product-provider-aligned intermediary role.
The case file points, as an individual-case anchor, to the DVAG imprint regarding tied-intermediary status under § 34d paragraph 7 GewO and at the same time to extensive coach- and advisor communication (Exhibits K48, K53, K57).
The regulatory question therefore reads:
Could an average customer clearly recognise the actual intermediary role — or did the external presentation generate a broader trust-and-advice picture?
6. Product tying and restricted choice
A further examination point concerns the product selection.
Where a distribution channel appears externally broad, holistic, cross-sectoral or product-neutral, but in fact certain product providers structurally dominate, the question arises whether customers were able to assess the basis of the recommendation correctly.
The following questions in particular are worth examining:
- Was it clearly explained whether the selection was made from the entire market?
- Was it clearly explained whether only certain product partners were available?
- Was the binding to insurers or financial groups disclosed comprehensibly?
- Was a product provider portrayed as merely "one of many", although it dominated economically or structurally?
- Were alternatives seriously examined?
- Was the restricted choice made practically comprehensible during the advisory conversation?
From the Plaintiff's perspective, in light of the exclusive distribution partnership publicly announced by Generali Deutschland AG on 28 September 2017 (Exhibit K42) and the simultaneous press release by DVAG (Exhibit K43), it is worth examining whether the advertising statements of the distribution organisation regarding the scope of product selection are compatible with the standard of the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt in its judgment 6 U 238/09 of 2 December 2010.
This page does not claim any inadmissibility. It describes the examination field.
7. Commissions, sales incentives and conflicts of interest
Commissions and sales incentives are not in themselves inadmissible.
They become relevant under regulatory law, however, where economic incentives are not transparent or can influence recommendations without customers understanding this sufficiently.
The following can in particular be worth examining:
- acquisition commissions;
- portfolio commissions;
- sales targets;
- cancellation liability;
- bonuses;
- group interests;
- kickbacks;
- incentive systems on the product-provider side;
- economic dependence of a distribution channel on certain product partners;
- indirect transfers of value, for example through dividends or profit-transfer agreements of affiliated group companies.
§ 48a paragraph 1 sentence 1 VAG provides that distribution remuneration must not collide with the duty of the insurance undertaking to act in the best interests of policyholders. BaFin specifies this standard in paragraph 46 et seq. of its Guidance Notice 01/2023 (VA): as the acquisition commission rises in relation to its "value", the incentive character increases, which must be taken into account when assessing possible conflicts of interest. Distribution remuneration encompasses, under § 7 No. 34b VAG, commissions, fees, charges as well as economic and non-economic benefits in connection with insurance distribution activities.
From the Plaintiff's perspective, in light of the commission ratio determined by the Plaintiff (Exhibit K49), the documented flow of dividends and profit transfers (Exhibits K44, K66) as well as the reciprocal interlocking of corporate bodies (Exhibits K46, K47, K65), it is worth examining:
- whether, in the undertaking's own self-assessment pursuant to paragraph 46 et seq. of BaFin Guidance Notice 01/2023 (VA), indirect transfers of value were also factored into the assessment;
- whether the organisational arrangements for avoiding customer-detrimental conflicts of interest pursuant to § 48a paragraphs 2 and 3 VAG are designed to be permanently effective.
Were customers in a position to recognise whether a recommendation followed solely their interest or could also be shaped by distribution and commission interests?
8. Coach, advisor and trust-based communication
One particular examination point concerns the tension between advertising trust-based communication and the legal intermediary role.
Where a distribution channel uses terms such as:
- financial coach;
- coach;
- advisor;
- sparring partner;
- life companion;
- "by your side";
- "100% for you";
- personal financial planning;
- independent advice,
this can give customers the impression that the contact person is primarily on the customer's side.
From a regulatory perspective, the question can then arise:
Does the external presentation generate a relationship of trust that can collide with a tied-intermediary position?
From the Plaintiff's perspective, in light of the evaluated training and recruiting materials (Exhibit K53), the web references (Exhibit K48) and the video content (Exhibit K57), it is worth examining whether the advisory pathways conveyed in the materials structurally support the duty arising under § 1a paragraph 1 VVG [Section 1a Insurance Contract Act — best-interest duty] — whereby insurance distributors must always act honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of policyholders.
The case file describes the coach- and advisor communication via, among other things, training architecture, private expert opinion on consumer perception and an empirical survey (Exhibit K58).
9. Product Oversight & Governance: product approval, target market and customer benefit
A further examination point concerns the question whether insurance products fit the target group and the actual customer situation.
Of particular supervisory relevance can be:
- product approval procedures (§ 23 paragraphs 1a–1c VAG);
- target-market determination;
- product oversight;
- examination of customer benefit;
- cost burden and effective costs;
- return and risk assumptions;
- distribution channel;
- information and advice effort at the point of sale;
- ongoing monitoring whether the product continues to fit the target market.
The legal basis is provided by § 23 paragraphs 1a–1c VAG and the Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2358 of 21 September 2017 (Official Journal L 341/1) laying down product oversight and governance requirements for insurance undertakings and insurance distributors, supplemented by Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1257 on sustainability preferences.
In its Guidance Notice 01/2023 (VA), BaFin sets out that life insurance undertakings must, in the product approval procedure, assess target market and customer benefit and subsequently monitor whether the product continues to meet the needs of target-market customers.
Was it ensured organisationally that products, distribution channel and customer group actually fit together?
10. European conduct-of-business and Value-for-Money line
National supervision operates within a continually concretised European framework.
The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) published, on 7 October 2024, a methodology for setting Value-for-Money benchmarks (document EIOPA-BoS-24-332). In its Costs-and-Past-Performance Report of 15 April 2025, EIOPA noted that cost reductions, such as those visible in the investment-fund market, have not yet materialised to the same extent in the market for Insurance-Based Investment Products.
In its third report on the application of the Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) of 30 March 2026, EIOPA expressly identified "misaligned incentives and insufficient transparency" as a continuing threat to consumer protection, particularly in the distribution of life insurance.
From the Plaintiff's perspective, in light of these supervisory risk indicators, it is worth examining:
- whether the cost and commission components borne in the distribution relationship at issue are compatible with the EIOPA thresholds for "undue costs";
- whether the transparency and conflict-avoidance arrangements implemented in the distribution channel can withstand the risk patterns identified by EIOPA;
- whether, in the assessment under § 48a paragraph 1 VAG in conjunction with the EIOPA Value-for-Money methodology, the economic substance of the distribution relationship is reflected at a depth meaningful for conduct-of-business supervision.
The Plaintiff does not assert these risk patterns for the specific contractual matter. She does, however, consider examination by reference to the EIOPA standards mentioned to be obvious.
11. Fit between insurance cover and risk classification
For insurance, not only the distribution is relevant but also the correct recording of the insured risk.
The following can in particular be worth examining:
- correct type of use;
- correct risk class;
- correct risk code;
- correct distinction between private and commercial;
- correct recording of rental, fleet or self-drive rental vehicles;
- correct premium calculation;
- correct documentation in policy, invoice and internal systems;
- effects on cover, premium and switching options.
In the specific proceedings, the Plaintiff submits that the fleet was treated as a "passenger car" or "private vehicle" despite the known rental use. The case file refers, among other things, to pre-contractual indications of rental use, corresponding knowledge on the part of Defendant 2 (Generali), email correspondence concerning the premium-relevant SFV registration, and Q1/2026 invoices marked "passenger car" or "private vehicle".
Was the insured risk recorded as it actually existed and as it was relevant for premium, cover and switching options?
12. Premium adjustments, loss ratios and asymmetric mechanisms
Premium-adjustment mechanisms can also be worth examining under regulatory law.
Particularly sensitive are structures in which premiums are increased on adverse development but no corresponding reduction follows on favourable development, or such reduction is not transparently traceable.
The following are particularly worth examining:
- bonus/malus rules;
- profit participations;
- loss ratios;
- restructuring surcharges;
- threshold values;
- unilateral adjustment clauses;
- calculation bases;
- transparency of the premium logic;
- documentation of increases and refused reductions.
In the specific proceedings, the case file describes a pillar concerning premium-reduction refusal despite a low loss ratio and the deletion or removal of a bonus/malus scale.
Were premium mechanisms applied transparently, in a balanced manner, and comprehensibly for the customer?
13. Complaints handling, disclosure and documentation
A further supervisory point concerns the handling of complaints, requests for information and disputed matters.
Worth examining can be:
- factual handling of complaints;
- complete release of relevant documentation;
- advisory documentation;
- policies and endorsements;
- calculation bases;
- loss histories;
- risk data;
- internal responsibilities;
- cross-references between distribution channel and insurer;
- complaint responses;
- escalation processes.
Duties on complaints handling are anchored in particular in § 17 of the Versicherungsvermittlungsverordnung (VersVermV) [Insurance Mediation Ordinance] and in the relevant BaFin supervisory practice.
In its 2024 complaints statistics and in the BaFin Journal interview of 20 April 2026, BaFin pointed out that the number of complaints about insurers in the life-insurance area has increased.
The case file contains, as an individual-case anchor, among other things, the refusal of the advice file by Defendant 1 (DVAG).
Were customer complaints and requests for information handled in a way that allowed customers to assess and exercise their rights properly?
14. Reminder, debt collection, termination and economic pressure
The handling of disputed claims can also be worth examining under supervisory law.
In particular, the question arises whether reminders, debt collection, threats of termination or other pressure mechanisms were used even though the underlying factual or legal questions were still in dispute.
Worth examining are in particular:
- reminders despite a substantiated objection;
- debt collection during ongoing clarification;
- threats of termination;
- threats of de-registration;
- reports to authorities;
- economic blockages;
- credit-rating risks;
- pressure payments;
- lack of separation between undisputed and disputed claims.
In the specific proceedings, the "pressure setting" is documented as a separate pillar, including, among other things, threats of de-registration, RBK consequences, and a debt-collection and termination complex.
Were disputed claims handled in such a way that customer interests, complaint rights and fair procedural processes were preserved?
15. IHK, trade supervision and intermediary register
In addition to BaFin, the Chambers of Industry and Commerce (IHK) as well as trade authorities can also be relevant.
This concerns in particular direct intermediary supervision and questions such as:
- registration as an insurance intermediary under § 34d GewO;
- tied-intermediary status under § 34d paragraph 7 GewO;
- correct register numbers;
- sub-intermediaries;
- status disclosures in the imprint;
- information about the intermediary's role;
- commercial reliability;
- intermediary duties under §§ 48–52 VAG.
In the specific proceedings, the case file contains references to DIHK and IHK register questions and to register numbers of individual sub-intermediaries that could not be located.
Were intermediary status, registration and legal role traceable and correctly documented for customers and supervisors?
16. Competition law and consumer transparency
Regulatory questions can also have competition-law significance.
Worth examining are in particular statements which can generate a particular role-understanding among consumers: independent · neutral · objective · coach · advisor · life companion · cross-sectoral · best solution · product comparison · "for you" · "by your side".
The relevant rules are, in particular, § 5 (misleading), § 5a (misleading by omission) and § 5b UWG (essential information) in conjunction with § 3 UWG.
A higher-court line on advertising with "independence" in insurance distribution is well established:
- Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, judgment 6 U 238/09 of 2 December 2010 — prohibition of advertising with "independent" even at a lower misperception rate;
- Oberlandesgericht Köln, judgment 6 U 63/25 of 11 March 2026 — confirmation of the line in representative-action proceedings, with explicit reliance on a survey of the relevant public as a methodological standard.
The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), in its decision "Marktführer Sport" (judgment I ZR 202/10 of 8 March 2012), expressly clarified that, when assessing the question of when a significant part of the public addressed is subject to a misleading impression, fixed percentages are not to be used; the normative assessment depends decisively on the evaluation of the circumstances of the individual case.
Can an external presentation be misleading if it generates an independent advisory picture, while in fact a tied or product-provider-aligned distribution structure exists?
This question is not equivalent to a legal violation. It describes a possible examination field.
From the Plaintiff's perspective, in light of the 28 advertising statements documented by her (Exhibit K48), the training materials (Exhibit K53) and the video content (Exhibit K57), it is worth examining whether these statements stand up to the standards of the decisions mentioned.
17. Data protection, disclosure and data quality
In financial and insurance distribution, personal data also play a central role.
Worth examining can be: customer data · risk data · loss histories · contract data · advisory documentation · transfers between distribution channel and insurer · data quality · correction of incorrect data · disclosure rights · deletion or correction · usability of data for switching providers.
Right of access under Article 15 GDPR. The Bundesgerichtshof has interpreted this right broadly in several decisions, including the judgments VI ZR 576/19 of 15 June 2021 and VI ZR 223/21 of 16 April 2024. Guidelines 01/2022 of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) in their final version of 28 March 2023 specify the standard to the effect that a blanket refusal on grounds of trade secrets is not permitted and partial redaction remains the rule.
Automated assessments and scoring. The Court of Justice of the European Union, in its judgments "SCHUFA scoring" (Case C-634/21 of 7 December 2023) and "Dun & Bradstreet Austria" (Case C-203/22 of 27 February 2025), has clarified that, under Article 15 paragraph 1 lit. h GDPR, data subjects must receive an explanation of the logic involved sufficient to allow effective contestation, where such procedures act "decisively" for a decision taken.
From the Plaintiff's perspective, it is worth examining:
- whether the Defendants have fully complied with the Plaintiff's far-reaching right of access;
- whether risk, credit-rating or distribution scores were used in the distribution or acceptance process which acted decisively for the decision on the contractual relationship within the meaning of the CJEU's interpretation;
- whether the requirements of Article 22 GDPR were complied with in such processing;
- whether customer data, risk data and contract data were maintained correctly, completely and traceably so that customers could exercise their rights and switch providers.
This page does not claim that any particular data processing has taken place. It points to the examination standards.
18. Digital Operational Resilience (DORA)
Since 17 January 2025, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA) has applied directly also to insurance and reinsurance undertakings.
Until 16 January 2025, the relevant examination canon for insurance undertakings was the BaFin Circular 10/2018 (VA) — Supervisory Requirements for IT in Insurance Undertakings (VAIT) in the version of 3 March 2022.
Now relevant under supervisory law can be:
- responsibility of the management body for ICT risk management (Article 5 DORA);
- ICT risk-management framework (Article 6 et seq. DORA);
- classification and reporting of major ICT incidents (Article 17 et seq. DORA);
- outsourcing to ICT third-party service providers (Article 28 et seq. DORA).
From the Plaintiff's perspective, in light of the investments in distribution-supporting ICT systems known to her (Exhibit K55), it is worth examining whether their design complied with the requirements of VAIT until 16 January 2025 and of DORA since 17 January 2025.
19. European context: Retail Investment Strategy
The questions raised here do not stand alone.
At European level, too, there has for years been a discussion of how private investors can be better protected from unclear costs, conflicts of interest, opaque product distribution and misleading marketing communication.
The European Commission presented the Retail Investment Strategy (RIS) on 24 May 2023 (proposals COM(2023) 278 final and COM(2023) 279 final). The aim is to put consumer interests at the centre of retail investments, so that private investors can take decisions that match their needs and preferences, are treated fairly and are appropriately protected.
On 18 December 2025, the Council and the European Parliament reached a political trilogue agreement on the RIS Omnibus Directive. The final corridor of the regime stepped back from a partial inducement ban, but firmed up the obligations to clearly and separately disclose inducement costs and to test against peer-group benchmarks (the "undue cost" concept).
The process was methodologically flanked by an external study (Kantar Public on behalf of DG FISMA of the European Commission, 2022, doi 10.2874/459190; Exhibit K51). In that study, in a sample of 176 financial products, indications were established that products with inducements show on average higher costs than commission-free comparison products.
This European discussion concerns in particular: cost clarity · commissions and inducements · conflicts of interest · Value for Money · marketing communication · suitability of products · consumer information · trust in financial markets · fair treatment of private investors.
The reference to the Retail Investment Strategy does not mean that an EU-law violation has been established in the specific case.
It does, however, show:
The questions about product costs, sales incentives, tied advice, marketing effects, customer benefit and conflicts of interest are not just an individual-case topic but the subject of a broad European regulatory discussion.
Already today, the relevant protective ideas can be derived from the parallel rules of MiFID II (Article 24 paragraphs 1 and 9), the IDD (Articles 17, 25, 27, 28, 29) and the Delegated Regulations (EU) 2017/565 (Articles 11–13) and (EU) 2017/2358.
20. Collective redress
With the Verbraucherrechtedurchsetzungsgesetz (VDuG) [Consumer Rights Enforcement Act], in force since 13 October 2023 (Federal Law Gazette 2023 I No. 272), the German legislator transposed Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers.
Qualified entities within the meaning of § 2 VDuG can bring redress actions or model declaratory actions. Pending proceedings are listed in the representative-actions register at the Federal Office of Justice (§ 46 VDuG). Standing under the Injunctions Act (UKlaG) and under § 8 UWG also remains available.
From the Plaintiff's perspective, it is worth examining whether, for similar fact patterns from multi-tier insurance and financial-services distribution, the conditions for collective enforcement can be met.
This page does not claim that such an action has been announced or is pending. It refers to the representative-actions register at the Federal Office of Justice as the central reference point.
21. Central examination question from the Plaintiff's perspective
From the Plaintiff's perspective, the regulatory dimension condenses into one core question:
May an insurer that profits economically from an exclusive or closely connected distribution system effectively hollow out regulatory responsibility by formally attributing the customer effect to the distribution channel?
Or put differently:
If the distribution channel generates trust, the insurer provides products, both are economically interlinked, and the customer cannot clearly separate the roles — who must then ensure under supervisory law that customer interests, transparency, product fit and complaint rights are preserved?
This question is not directed against the existence of tied distribution channels as such.
It concerns the boundary between permissible distribution organisation and supervisory-law relevant shifting of responsibility.
22. What this page does not claim
This page does not claim:
- that a supervisory-law violation has been established with final and binding effect;
- that BaFin has already made any particular assessment in the specific case;
- that DVAG or Generali have been convicted under regulatory law;
- that every tied distribution channel is inadmissible;
- that commissions are inadmissible per se;
- that every coach- or advisory formulation is unlawful;
- that every customer was deceived;
- that the standards developed in the EIOPA, CJEU or OLG decisions cited have been exceeded in the specific dispute.
This page describes possible examination fields. The assessment is for courts, supervisory authorities and competent bodies.
23. Information sought
Experiences of persons with similar actual processes help to concretise the regulatory examination fields described here. The relevant topic areas are bundled on a separate page — structured by advice, trust, commissions, product tying, contract changes, insurance recording, pressure settings and internal distribution experiences.
To the witness page — 8 topic areas
24. Closing note
This page is intended as a structured presentation of possible regulatory examination fields.
It does not replace any official examination. It does not replace any court decision.
It is intended to make visible that questions about tied advice, distribution interlinkage, product tying, commission interests, customer benefit, complaints handling, data protection, digital resilience and allocation of responsibility may not only be private points of dispute but can also have supervisory, data-protection and European dimensions.